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Process Safety Analysis (HAZOP)

6 weeks · 0 milestones

Conduct a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) analysis for a real or representative process section, applying the HAZOP methodology systematically to identify potential deviations, their causes, consequences, and safeguards. The analysis must cover: at least 2 process nodes (defined sections of the P&ID) with all relevant guide words applied to each parameter (flow, temperature, pressure, composition, level), a completed HAZOP worksheet for each node (deviation, cause, consequence, severity/likelihood rating, existing safeguards, and recommendations), identification of at least 3 significant hazard scenarios with unacceptable risk that require additional safeguards, and a safeguard recommendation table. The analysis must be based on a real or realistic P&ID — not a hypothetical system described in prose. Preferred proof: a HAZOP study conducted as part of a real project safety review. Accessible alternative: HAZOP of a publicly documented process (many published process engineering case studies include simplified P&IDs suitable for HAZOP exercises; IChemE publishes free guidance with example systems). The HAZOP methodology is fully documented in free HSE and CCPS guidance documents — no software license required. Proof artifacts: the HAZOP worksheet (analysis artifact) and the safeguard recommendation table (documentation artifact). Verification: a process safety engineer challenges the consequence assessment for the most severe scenario identified — 'you assessed this as a toxic release to atmosphere; have you considered the domino effect on adjacent equipment?' — requiring you to reason through your own hazard scenario.

Milestone map

Milestone map

3 milestones

Select a process system and produce a process flow diagram with design intent

2–3 weeks (system selection + PFD production + stream table)

Select a process engineering system suitable for a HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) analysis. Suitable systems include: a heat exchanger network (shell-and-tube heat exchanger with feed and product streams, cooling water circuit, and bypass); a simple chemical reactor system (continuous stirred tank reactor with feed, jacket cooling, and product streams); a distillation column with reboiler and condenser; a pump-and-pipeline system with control valves, check valves, and a receiver vessel; or a gas compression system. The system must have at least five process lines (streams) and at least two pieces of major equipment. Produce a Process Flow Diagram (PFD) showing: all major equipment (with equipment tag numbers), all process streams with flow direction, the key process parameters at each stream (temperature, pressure, flow rate, composition if relevant), and the control philosophy (which parameters are controlled and how). Free tool: draw.io with the engineering shape library.

Proof required

Submit: (1) the Process Flow Diagram (PFD) with equipment tags, stream labels, and process parameter annotations (draw.io export or equivalent); (2) a design intent statement for the system (200–300 words) covering: what the system is designed to do, the key process parameters it operates at (normal operating temperature, pressure, flow), and the key safety constraints (maximum allowable working pressure, maximum temperature, minimum flow to prevent cavitation or dry running); (3) a stream table listing all process streams with their normal operating conditions.

What gets checked

  • PFD includes equipment tag numbers for all major equipment — 'HX-101 (shell-and-tube heat exchanger)' and 'P-101 (feed pump)' are valid tags; unlabelled boxes are not engineering drawings
  • Stream table lists at least temperature, pressure, and flow rate for all named streams — a stream table with only stream names and no operating conditions has not captured the design intent
  • Design intent statement specifies the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP) or maximum operating temperature as a safety constraint — these are the parameters that HAZOP deviations will be assessed against

Common mistakes

  • Selecting a system so simple it has fewer than five process lines — a single pipe from a tank to a pump has one process line; a HAZOP on one line cannot demonstrate the systematic deviation study methodology across multiple nodes
  • Drawing a block flow diagram rather than a process flow diagram — a block flow diagram shows process steps as boxes; a PFD shows equipment symbols (heat exchanger symbols, pump symbols, vessel symbols) with stream connections and operating parameters

Resources

Foundationstart here

Depthgo deeper

Masteryfor the dedicated

What a verifier looks for

  • Engineering Design Triad: M1 produces a design artifact (PFD with equipment tags, stream labels, and process parameters) — this is the first of three artifact types required across M1–M3.
  • PFD must use proper equipment symbols — check that heat exchangers, pumps, and vessels are drawn with standard chemical engineering symbols, not generic boxes.
  • Stream table must include temperature, pressure, and flow rate for all streams — check that all named streams have entries.
  • Design intent must specify at least one safety constraint with a numerical value — MAWP, maximum temperature, or minimum flow.
  • Reviewer must be a chemical or process engineer — PFD accuracy and design intent completeness require discipline-specific expertise.

Conduct a structured HAZOP study across at least three process nodes

3–4 weeks (HAZOP study + worksheet completion)

Conduct a HAZOP study on the process system from Milestone 1. Apply the standard HAZOP methodology: divide the PFD into nodes (sections of pipe or equipment between major items); for each node, systematically apply the HAZOP guide words (No/None, More, Less, Reverse, Other Than, As Well As) to each process parameter (Flow, Temperature, Pressure, Level, Composition); for each meaningful deviation (guide word + parameter), identify: the credible cause, the consequence (what happens to the process and/or safety), the existing safeguards (instrumentation, relief valves, alarms, interlocks), and the recommendation (any additional safeguard or action required if the existing safeguards are insufficient). Complete the HAZOP for at least three nodes, covering all six guide words for at least the Flow and Pressure parameters at each node. Record the study in a HAZOP worksheet table.

Proof required

Submit: (1) the completed HAZOP worksheet table covering at least three nodes — the table must include columns for: Node, Parameter, Guide Word, Deviation, Cause, Consequence, Existing Safeguards, Recommendation; (2) a brief methodology note (100 words) confirming the team composition (real or hypothetical), the node boundaries used, and any deviations that were screened out as non-credible with the reason.

What gets checked

  • HAZOP worksheet covers all six guide words for Flow and Pressure at every node — a worksheet that applies only 'No Flow' and 'High Flow' has not completed the systematic guide-word study; 'Reverse Flow', 'Low Flow', 'Other Than' (wrong composition in stream), and 'As Well As' (contamination) must also appear
  • Every meaningful deviation has a populated Cause, Consequence, and Safeguard column — a deviation row with 'N/A' in the Consequence column when the consequence is potentially serious indicates the study was not conducted with sufficient rigour
  • Recommendations are specific and actionable — 'install a low-flow alarm on FIC-101 with setpoint at 20% of normal flow, to alert operator before pump cavitation damage occurs' is a valid recommendation; 'add more instrumentation' is not

Common mistakes

  • Applying only 'High' and 'Low' deviations and omitting 'No/None', 'Reverse', 'Other Than', and 'As Well As' — a partial guide-word study is not a HAZOP; the systematic completeness of the guide-word application is the defining feature of the methodology
  • Recording consequences as 'process upset' without specifying the physical mechanism — a consequence must describe what physically happens: 'pump cavitation, leading to pump damage and potential seal failure with consequent hydrocarbon release' is a valid consequence; 'process upset' is not

Resources

Foundationstart here

Depthgo deeper

What a verifier looks for

  • Engineering Design Triad: M2 produces an analysis artifact (HAZOP worksheet — a systematic hazard analysis) — this is the primary deliverable of the HAZOP study.
  • All six guide words must appear for Flow and Pressure at each node — check that 'No/None', 'More', 'Less', 'Reverse', 'Other Than', and 'As Well As' are all represented.
  • Consequences must be physically specific — check a random sample of five deviation rows; reject any consequence described as 'process upset' without a physical mechanism.
  • Recommendations must be specific and actionable — check that each recommendation names a specific instrument, interlock, or procedural change.
  • Reviewer must be a chemical or process engineer with HAZOP or process safety experience — HAZOP worksheet quality and recommendation completeness require discipline-specific safety engineering expertise.

Produce the HAZOP report and present findings to a qualified reviewer

2–3 weeks (report compilation + reviewer meeting)

Compile the PFD (M1) and HAZOP worksheet (M2) into a structured HAZOP report. The report must include: an executive summary with a risk ranking of the top three hazards identified; a system description and PFD; the HAZOP methodology section (node selection, guide words used, team composition); the complete HAZOP worksheet; a risk summary table ranking the top five hazard scenarios by severity and likelihood (using a 3×3 risk matrix — Low/Medium/High for both); a recommendations register (all recommendations from the worksheet summarised with a priority, a responsible party, and a target completion date or trigger); and a conclusions section. Present the HAZOP report to a qualified reviewer (chemical or process engineer, or safety professional with HAZOP experience) in a structured 25–40 minute review session where they challenge the completeness of at least one node's study.

Proof required

Submit: (1) the complete HAZOP report (all sections above); (2) the risk summary table (top five hazard scenarios with severity, likelihood, and risk rating from the risk matrix); (3) the recommendations register (all recommendations with priority, responsible party, and target date); (4) a written record of the reviewer's completeness challenge and your response (250 words minimum, attributing reviewer by professional role and HAZOP experience).

What gets checked

  • Risk summary table uses a risk matrix with explicit severity and likelihood criteria — 'High severity: potential for fatality or serious injury; Medium severity: potential for injury requiring medical treatment; Low severity: minor injury or no injury but process disruption' are valid criteria; 'High/Medium/Low' without criteria cannot be consistently applied
  • Recommendations register assigns a priority to every recommendation — 'Priority 1 (Critical — implement before next start-up)' and 'Priority 3 (Opportunity — implement at next planned shutdown)' are valid priorities; unranked recommendations leave the operating team with no guidance on what to do first
  • Reviewer challenge addresses the completeness of the guide-word application — 'you identified High Flow as a credible cause but did not consider the scenario where the control valve fails open due to instrument air failure, which would also cause High Flow; this needs a separate cause entry' is a valid completeness challenge

Common mistakes

  • Producing a risk matrix without defining the severity and likelihood criteria before applying it — a risk rating of 'High' applied inconsistently across the hazard scenarios is worse than no risk rating, because it gives a false sense of relative priority
  • Omitting the recommendations register — the HAZOP worksheet identifies hazards; the recommendations register is what makes the HAZOP actionable; a HAZOP report without a register is a hazard identification exercise, not a safety management tool

Resources

Foundationstart here

Depthgo deeper

What a verifier looks for

  • Engineering Design Triad check: M1–M3 together produce a design artifact (PFD with design intent + stream table), an analysis artifact (HAZOP worksheet with systematic deviation study), and a documentation artifact (HAZOP report with risk summary table and recommendations register) — confirm all three types are present.
  • Risk matrix must define severity and likelihood criteria explicitly — check that the criteria are stated in the report, not just implied.
  • Recommendations register must assign priority to every recommendation — check that no recommendation is unranked.
  • Reviewer challenge must address a specific node's completeness — a general approval is not a completeness challenge.
  • Reviewer must be a chemical or process engineer with HAZOP experience — HAZOP completeness evaluation and risk matrix calibration require discipline-specific safety engineering expertise.
  • The Proof Accessibility Rule applies — draw.io, UK HSE publications, EPA resources, IChemE free resources, and AIChE CCPS free introductory content are all accessible without payment.

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